# Practice-Based Discourse Analysis of Information Security Policy in Health Care

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**Abstract.** Information security is an understudied area within electronic government. In this study, we examine the quality of information security policy design in health care. Employees cause a majority of the security breaches in health care, and many of them are unintentional. In order to support the formulation of practical, from the employees' perspective, information security policies, we propose eight tentative quality criteria. These criteria were developed using practice-based discourse analysis on three information security policy documents from a health care organisation.

**Keywords:** Information security policy, Discourse Analysis, Communicative Analysis, Quality criteria

## 1    Introduction

Electronic government is becoming more advanced [1], and it reshapes the workings of public administration. At the same time, information and information systems have become key assets in, for example, health care. Here is timely access to correct electronic medical records (EMR) essential in order to provide medical care of high quality. Consequently, the importance of information security increases; the confidentiality, availability and integrity of business information assets need to be kept at the level regulated by laws and public administration policies.

Electronic government, as a research field, has been criticized for focusing on providing and describing new technical solutions [2]. Therefore, it may not be surprising that information security has not received much attention in the electronic government community. Consequently, and hardly surprising when information security has been addressed it has often been limited to the more narrow aspects of computer security [e.g. 3, 4]. However, information security also includes socio-behavioural aspects [5], and information security policies are often the main vehicle used by management for guiding the security behaviours of employees. Furthermore, when it comes to information security breaches many studies conclude that insiders, i.e. em-

ployees, cause a majority of these breaches [6, 7]. It is argued that employees' poor compliance with information security policies is a perennial problem for many organizations [8, 9]. Having said that, existing research also shows that about half of all breaches caused by insiders are accidental [10], which means that one can question how useful today's information security policies are in guiding employees.

Despite the importance of information security policies the design of such artefacts is an understudied area of information security research in general [11], and in the context of electronic government in particular. Gaskell [12], one of few who has studied the design process, has characterized the information security policy design process as ad-hoc. The main input that information security managers draw upon during such a design process is elicited information security requirements and international security standards, such as the ISO-27000 series [13]. Standards are general guidelines not addressing the specific context of an organisation [14], such as the specific needs of healthcare, making the elicited requirements an important complement.

If few studies focus information security policy design, even fewer studies have been carried out on information security policies as communicative objects and what constitutes a useful information security policy from a communicative point of view. Stahl et al [15] is a notable exception, who based on a discourse analysis of information security policies provide six advices for the development of information security policies. Of course, this is a valuable contribution, but according to Baskerville's and Siponen's [11] taxonomy of information security policies, Stahl et al. [15] mainly focus on high-level policies. With this focus they seem to leave out the problematic aspect that employees often are exposed to several documents that together constitute the information security policy. We therefore take an explicit starting point in a practice-based perspective. This means that a) we critically assess the role of the information security policy as a *practical tool* in the employee's every day work, including the use of both high-level *and* low-level policy documents, and b) we acknowledge the fact that there exist *multiple practices* in an organisation that *need to interact*. To this end we view information security policy documents as the results of the interaction (or lack thereof) between the information security practice and the health care practice. Information security policy documents are in this setting thus seen as communicative objectives.

The purpose of this paper is a) to illustrate the usefulness of practice-based discourse analysis for understanding information security policy design, and b) to provide a set of tentative quality criteria for information security policy design in health care from a practice-based perspective. For this purpose, we carried out a case study at a Swedish emergency hospital. We employed a *practice-based* discourse analysis on the hospital's information security policy. A practice-based discourse analysis means besides collecting and analysing information security policy texts, that we also have studied the mentioned practices through observations and interviewing. The latter is important in order to interpret the communicative limitations of the policy from the *employees'* perspective. Hence, this research responds to the call for more research on employees' behaviour with respect to information security policies within health care [16] and it focuses communicative aspects of the information security policy artefact, which is an even more understudied area. As far as we know there

exist no quality criteria for information security policy design in health care anchored in a practice-based perspective.

## 2　Information security policy theories

An information security policy is a general rule for directing acceptable behaviour of employees when using an organisation's information assets [17]; they provide information security management with a vehicle for establishing information security practices in organisations [18]. Given the strategic importance of information assets it is nowadays stressed that information security management should be integrated into corporate governance [19]. The executive management at the strategic level outlines a set of directives to indicate the importance of information assets, which are operationalized through the organisation's information security policy design.

While information security governance research fail to offers detailed guidance on how to develop information security policies [e.g. 20], there exists practitioner-oriented literature that do [e.g. 21, 22-24]. However, this literature focuses on design guidelines without reflecting on the end products' usefulness from an employee perspective. Scholarly studies about information security policy design exist as well. Gaskell [12] and Sibley [25] have described the information security policy formulation as an ad-hoc process, although, for example, Wood [26] has stressed the importance of a well thought out design process. It is common in information security literature to recommend that this process should be informed by information security standards [12, 27]. However, the use of information security standards has been criticised, since they do not take into account that organisations differ [11, 14, 28], and Wood [26] argued that 'one must understand the special needs of an organization before one attempts to generate specific written management directives'. Knapp et al. [29] provided a more balanced view when proposing that both external and internal aspects of an organisation should influence information security policy work. Research on techniques for eliciting local information security requirements [e.g. 30, 31] make a valuable contribution in such cases.

Although there is a large body of research on information security policy, and much consensus can be found with regard to the importance of information security policies, less attention has been given to how to design the content of these policies. Wood [26] provided guidelines for the information security policy design process, arguing that different audiences often require tailored policies. Baskerville and Siponen [11] explored the design of information security policies, but their conclusions are limited to emerging organisations. Still, Doherty et al. [32] stated that 'there are very few studies that explicitly address how the scope or content of information security policies support the employee in their daily work.' They concluded that there is a wide diversity of disparate policies in use and that they contain a low degree of detail. A somewhat broader take on how to design information security policy content also shows a debate about the ideal number of policies in an organisation and how they should be inter-related [e.g. 11, 33, 34]. However, Lindup [35] has noted that in practice organisations often have one single information security policy.

In summary, existing research stresses the importance of congruent communication, and that information security policies should align both with business strategies and international standards. However, we found few empirical studies that address the communicative quality of information security policies. One exception is the study by Stahl et al. [15] who present six advices on how to design an information security policy, based on a critical discourse analysis of twenty-five information security policies. These advices are: 'Write policies using accessible language and terminology', 'Provide a separate set of employee-oriented guidelines, if these will help to effectively communicate the subset of issues that are applicable to all employees', 'Ground the policies in issues that are important to users, to demonstrate their relevance, providing concrete examples where appropriate', 'Focus the substantive content of the policies to issues of general importance to the entire workforce', 'Move technical content for specialist audiences to clearly referenced appendices or separate policy documents' and 'Give specific and actionable advice and practical guidelines'.

## 3 Research approach

### 3.1 The study object and its implication on overall research strategy

The research approach taken in this study is discourse analysis [36]. Discourse in an open sense 'cover all forms of spoken interaction, formal and informal, and written texts of all kind' (ibid p 7). An inter-textual analysis is a natural element of discourse analysis. So is also an action perspective: 'Texts … do not just describe things; they *do* things. And being active, they have social and political implications' (ibid p 6; emphasis in original). A discourse analysis of an information security policy will thus study how different text elements relate to each other; how well they are congruently building up the whole of the text. The discourse analysis will also study how the text is intended to influence the regulated practice and how it succeeds to comply with governing statements of higher order (standards and regulations). A discourse analysis of this kind is qualitative and interpretive with the purpose to reveal meanings of inter-textual and efficacious character. As a practice-based discourse analysis, we have besides collection and analysis of the information security policy texts also studied the mentioned practices through observations and interviewing.

### 3.2 Case study and data collection

This study is as a case study [37], and the analysis is based on a reading of three documents that regulate the information security practice in one medium-size Swedish county council. The information security policy consists of one high-level policy document, and two low-level documents that more in detail describe information security instructions and rules. The findings in these documents were complemented with interviews with three high-level information security managers. The interviews gave us deeper knowledge about the county council's information security policies and how they were designed. In order get an understanding of the type of practice we studied, we selected one hospital within the county council for studies of information

security policy compliance and translation in practice. We chose a hospital with about 750 employees, 142 places of treatment that serves around 90 000 citizens. Hence, it can be categorised as a large organisation. The degree of computerization varied in the hospital, where some clinics used EMR, while other do not. Two clinics at the hospital were chosen as cases based on their different degrees of computerization of patient information: one clinic had manual handling of medical records; the other has used an EMR system for a number of years. This variety was important for providing us with rich data concerning information security in both light and heavy computerized settings, both of which are common in health care. We carried out twenty-four semi-structured interviews with health care staff (e.g., nurses, physicians, administrators) at the two clinics The interviews lasted between one and two hours and concerned how information security were translated and carried out in practice, together with the reasons for the information security actions. The interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. We complemented the interviews with 28 hours of observations of the information security practice. The observations were documented by note-taking and, when appropriate, by photographs. The interviews and observations taken together gave us deeper knowledge about how information security was carried out and integrated in the health care practice. During observations we focused on the same categories as during the interviews, i.e., areas regulating the information security practice. This resulted in re-interviewing and further probing about the rationality for information security actions in practice.

### 3.3    A conceptual framework for practice-based discourse analysis

We characterize this type of discourse analysis as practice-based. A practice is considered to be "embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized around shared practical understanding" [38, p 2]. This means that language and discourse is part of a practice. A practice consists of humans and their activities including material and semiotic elements. Thus, a study of documents (as e.g. information security policies) cannot be made without taking into account the practices where these documents are generated and used. As mentioned above, Potter & Wetherell [36] emphasised the discourse as something people do. Three important influences to be used in discourse analysis have been suggested by Potter & Wetherell: a semiotic understanding of different language functions; a speech act-based understanding of utterances; an ethnomethodological understanding of conversation. Consequently, they have stated these demands, but they have not synthesised and operationalised these theoretical orientations into a coherent approach for discourse analysis.

Within information systems research there exists several studies that use different linguistic theories, but usually only one such theory at a time. Goldkuhl [39] has presented a socio-pragmatic communication framework adapted to studies in information systems. It is a synthesis of mainly speech act theory [e.g. 40], ethnomethodological conversation analysis [41] and semiotics [e.g. 42]. Goldkuhl's [39] framework consists of nine communicative functions. It emphasises a multi-functional view of language and communication, i.e. we do several things at the same time while communi-

cating. The nine functions are shown in Table 1 together with an explanation of each function, and the analytical questions we have used to assess each function.

**Table 1.** Goldkuhl's [39] framework of communicative functions

| Communicative function | Explanation | Analytical question |
|---|---|---|
| Accountable | The message is comprehensible, i.e. include sufficient self-references and arguments to explain its role in the communication process. | What is meant? |
| Carried | The message is using the features of some medium. | How? By what means? |
| Constitutive | The message creates changes in social states between communicators and sometimes socially broader. | What is done? |
| Directed | The message is intended towards one or more addressees. | To whom? |
| Expressive | The message is an expression of the locutor's subjectivity (e.g. disires, emotions, values). | By whom? |
| Referential | The message is saying something about something in the world. | About what? |
| Pre-situationally compliant | The message is in accordance with general institutions and norms and specific pre-situational grounds. | Why? What reasons there? |
| Projected future actions | The message is an initiative for further actions. | For what? |
| Situationally responsive | The message is a response to prior messages and other situational features. | Why? What reasons there? |

We have modified the terminology of two functions (constitutive, carried) in order to make them more intelligible. In our discourse analysis we have selected seven of these functions to use for our study of the information security policy. We have not used the functions of carried (since it is sufficient with a general characterization that policies are written documents), or situationally responsive (since the demand to write a policy has been excluded from our analysis).

## 3.4 Analytical steps

A classical dilemma and choice in empirical social research is how to be open-minded vs. to be informed by previous theories in relation to the data material. In our study we used both strategies. We studied the text in an inductive and open-minded way, and then in the further analysis of the text we applied Goldkuhl's [39] framework in a theory-informed way. We have adopted an inquiry attitude [43], i.e. searched for and recorded what seems problematic in some way from a communicative point of view.

In our case these principles meant the following. First, the information security policy has been read through and we have noticed all things that caught our attention as being communicatively problematic. We made an open coding of data through this reading [44], just stating what kind problems or other peculiarities we identified. This means that we have selected a set of policy declarations and made annotations to be used for further analysis.

Second we carried out the theory-informed discourse analysis using the results from the open coding as input. The theory-informed analysis in our case meant employing the analytical questions in Table 1. Furthermore, in order to carry out this step the interviews and observations were necessary background information. We used this information to interpret the policy declarations (when asking the analytical questions) from an employee point of view, since a practice-based discourse analysis of an information security policy requires taking into account the practice where it is used. For example, we used this background understanding when interpreting what the confidentiality instructions meant for the medical secretaries when they are to fax patient information to another care provider. The information security policy stated that 'Patients should be confident that sensitive information does not reach unauthorized'. A second guideline was the following: 'Whatever form the information has, or the way in which it is transmitted or stored, it must always receive adequate protection.' When reading these statements we concluded that the instructions were directed (to whom?) towards the medical secretaries. However, the instructions were vague when it came to projected future actions (for what?). Our interviews and observations revealed that the instructions were interpreted as follows by the staff: First, the medical secretary checked whether or not the care provider requesting the medical record had the patient's consent or not, either documented in the medical records or provided by the inquiring part. Second, the medical secretary removed the social security number from the physical medical record. This was done to anonymise the medical record when sending it via fax. Third, she/he added a temporary code, for example 2020. Finally, after faxing the medical secretary called her/his contact person at the requesting care provider in order to tell the temporary code. However, this set of actions was difficult to understand of from only reading the information security policy.

The third step was carried out to organise the analysed policy declarations into overall themes. These themes, which were inductively generated, are to be seen as broader problem areas based on the detailed analysis. We ended up with four themes of importance for design of practical communicative information security policies: external congruence, goal conflicts, internal congruence, and target group. These themes were used when constructing the tentative quality criteria, which are found in Section 4.2.

## 4 From discourse analysis to tentative quality criteria

At the hospital the employees had to deal with three different information security policy documents that together constituted the information security policy. One document contained a high-level description of the information security regulations,

while additional two documents contained low-level descriptions. The presentation below is structured according to the thematic analysis we carried out as the third analytical step. The analysis was brought further through the formulation of eight tentative quality criteria (Section 4.2). Table 2 shows examples from our analysis. The table has three columns. The left-most column contains identifiers referring to the policy documents. Passages from the high-level document are referred to using 1.x, while the two low-level documents are referred to as 2.x and 3.x. The second column shows the policy declarations. Finally, the right-most column contains the analysis. Due to the limited space we only present the communicative functions that were considered problematic when analysing the policy declarations.

## 4.1 Thematic analysis of information security policy

*Internal congruence* is our first theme. This theme includes concerns about projected future actions that arise from incomplete explanations and definitions, inconsistent use of terminology, inconsistent communicative function, inconsistent description of the information security mechanisms in use, inconsistent description of the same rule and unclear references between the different information security policy documents. The incomplete explanations and definitions found in the three policy documents can be exemplified with passage 2.7 in Table 2. This quote refers to 'sensitive information' that must be removed from the hard drive before the computer is handed over to external service. However, none of the three investigated policy documents contains a definition of 'sensitive information'. Later on in the same document the term 'business critical information' is introduced but never defined. Furthermore, the differences between these categories are not accounted for. It results in a lack of guidance of the employees due to lack of definitions.

**Table 2.** Practice-based discourse analysis of information security policy

| No | Policy declaration | Analysis |
|----|-------------------|----------|
| 1.2 | 'Information security must protect patients, employees and the public from harm caused by deficiencies in information management or disruption in information systems. The protection of human life, health and privacy are valued the most.' | *Pre-situational grounds:* Based on health law and security standards. *Accountable:* A goal conflict between health and privacy is built into this policy statement. *Projected future actions:* There is no guidance to users for choice between conflicting goals. |
| 1.3 | 'Laws and regulations shall constitute the lowest level when specifying security measures and controls.' | *Pre-situational grounds:* Difficulties to know which laws and regulations one is to pay attention to. *Projected future actions:* Risk that laws and regulations are neglected. |
| 1.4 | 'Information security is achieved by developing and complying with appropriate management tools such as | *Pre-situational grounds:* Lack of compliance with security standards; neglect of technical, physical and |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | information security policies, guidelines, and instructions.' | informal security. *Accountable:* Contradictory to other statements that include technical security (confusing). *Projected future actions:* Risk that other measures (e.g. technical obstacles) can be neglected. |
| 2.4 | 'Each user of the County Council's computers and computer systems is responsible for complying with the following rules. The fact that the county council's computers are not equipped with functions that in all events prevent non-compliance or monitor compliance does not mean that violations are permitted. The users are entrusted to work with responsibility.' | *Accountable:* Clear signals of technical measures are in conflict with parts that signal administrative measures. *Constitutive:* Attempt to state a clear regulative relation to users. *Projected future actions:* The users need to be attentive to stated rules and fully rely on technical obstacles. |
| 2.6 | 'If you leave your work place, you must lock the PC using the "Ctrl-Alt-Del" or log out, even if it is just for a short while.' | *Accountable:* Very clear and detailed instruction implies a shift in the text from abstract explanations to concrete and detailed measures. Hard to detect for the reader from the document how and when this type of shift occurs. *Projected future actions:* Very clear measures specified. |
| 2.7 | 'If your personal computer is handed over - for external services, you must ensure that any sensitive information is removed from the hard drive. It is the organisation's responsibility to ensure that the drives are cleaned before the computer goes to scrapping or another organisation. IT Support provides software for cleaning and can assist with cleanup.' | *Directed:* Ambiguous addressee (you vs. organisation). *Accountable:* Sensitive information is undefined here and in the document. *Constitutive:* Ambiguous responsibility is constituted. *Projected future actions:* Little guidance for the users to take actions concerning file deletion when the PC is handed over to external parties. |
| 2.10 | 'Information classification should be performed according to documented rules for classification of information.' | *Directed:* This instruction does not target regular users. |
| 2.11 | Examples of advice for management of information:<br><br>• 'Information shall not be stored on the "own" local disc<br>• Backup should always be taken | *Accountable:* Why are "examples" given; not a complete list? *Constitutive*: What is meant by "advice" in this regulative context? These seem rather to be rules. *Directed:* These "advices" are addressed not only to |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | • Unauthorized access shall be prevented' | regular users. Unclear who the addressees are. *Projected future actions:* Difficult for users to understand the scope of the instructions. |
| 2.17 | The 'Information security policy'-document is referred to as the IT-policy in the 'Security instructions for county council IT users'-document. | *Referential:* the reference to the documents is incorrect. The naming of the document is inconsistent. |
| 3.5 | 'Do not save patient information or other sensitive information on your local hard drive.' | *Accountable:* Unclear what 'other sensitive information' means. *Projected future actions:* Unclear what information can be saved locally |
| 3.7 | 'Sensitive information may only in exceptional cases be saved on the local hard drive.' | *Accountable:* Unclear what 'sensitive information' means. In addition, earlier they have stated that you are not allowed to store sensitive information on your local hard drive. Cf. 3.5 *Projected future actions:* Unclear what actions are allowed or not. |

Passage 1.4 in Table 2 is to some extent related to the use of definitions, however it is an example of inconsistent use of terminology once it is introduced. Example 1.4 gives the impression that information security is achieved through 'information security policies, guidelines, and instructions', which means that technical measures are not necessary. However, it contradicts, for example, passages 2.4, 2.6 and 2.11 that clearly contain references to technical security controls. It is also contradicts other references to the existence of technical security controls, such as password controls: 'Do not reveal your password to others, or lend out your authorization'. Consequently, the first and second policy documents give different impressions of what types of information security measures that are needed, and also how the most fundamental concept in the policy, information security, is defined.

The three documents have inconsistent communicative functions. Information security management switches from being regulative to in some parts being educational. As discussed in Section 2 the main purpose of a policy is limiting acceptable behaviour of employees, meaning that its primary communicative function is to be regulative. Of course, it is sometimes necessary to educate employees, but the two types of communicative functions are highly intertwined in the documents, without clear indication which communicative function that is in focus. For example, the detailed instructions on how to lock a workstation (Passage 2.6), is followed by an educational passage on why functionality to log the employees' activities is used: 'Logging of activities and transactions are carried out in order to continuously monitor the security of the IT systems. The purpose is to trace important events if disturbances occur in the systems. Tracing is also used to free the innocent, and discover threats to the information security.' Another educational passage in the document is a discussion on

malware: 'code in the form of viruses, trojans, or worms could damage, distort or destroy information, or make sensitive information available to persons not allowed to see the information … Malware can be said to be software'. Passage 2.6 is also an example of how the available information security mechanisms are described using an inconsistent level of abstraction. This specific passage is a very clear and detailed instruction compared to a passage similar to the following one, which is found sentences earlier: 'Remember that you are responsible for everything that is registered with your user identity.' Hence, from an employee's point it becomes difficult to understand the role of the document. Passages 3.5 and 3.7 are examples of inconsistent descriptions of the same rule. In this case it concerns if the employee are allowed to store sensitive information on 'the local hard drive'. In passage 3.5 the regular user is not allowed to store sensitive information on the computer. While, passage 3.7 states that such information should only 'in exceptional cases be saved on the local hard drive'. This is an inconsistent description, where the employees are left in the dark on how to act. Finally, as discussed earlier the investigated information security policy consists of three documents, and they contain references to each other. But the naming of the documents is not consistent (2.17), which means that it is difficult for the employees to find the right related document. For example, the 'Information security policy'-document is referred to as the IT-policy in the 'Security instructions for county council IT users'-document.

*Target group* is the second theme, which covers the problem of ambiguous addressees in three policy documents. Passage 2.7 in Table 2 shows one such case. As discussed above, the example concerns how to handle the computer when it is handed over to a third, external, part for service. However, the regulation is ambiguous. In the first part of the example, there is a focus on 'you' as the addressee: 'If your personal computer is handed over - for external services, you must ensure that any sensitive information is removed from the hard drive'. But in the next sentence it is at the same time the responsibility of the organisation, which means that it is not the employee's responsibility. Finally, when the third sentence reads 'IT Support provides software for cleaning and can assist with clean-up', which yet again signals that it is the employee's responsibility. A second example of ambiguous addresses is passage 2.10: 'Information classification should be performed according to documented rules for classification of information.' Information classification is carried out in order to determine the right level of information security measure. It is normally an activity of information security management or general management. If employees would carry out this activity they might start neglecting existing information security measure based on their own classifications. Consequently, it is not evident who the information security management is actually regulating, which in the end means that an ambiguous responsibility is constituted.

*External congruence* is the third identified theme. In several occasions the three policy documents reference other documents such as laws, regulation, or standards. However, the congruence with these sources is not clear. Passage 1.4 claims, as discussed earlier, that information security is achieved through 'information security policies, guidelines, and instructions.' Hence it is a focus on administrative routines, neglecting technical, physical and informal information security. The same document

refers to the ISO-standard 17799, which does not described information security as something to be addressed by administrative means only. Another problem with the information security policy documents is that information security management references laws and regulations in general, without specifying exactly which laws and regulations (Passage 1.3). Consequently, it is difficult for the employees to know exactly which laws and regulations they are to pay attention to.

*Goal conflicts* are the fourth and final theme we identified. The three investigated policy documents included a number of goal conflicts. Passage 1.2 concerns the tension between protection of human life and health on one hand, and protection of patient information, i.e. privacy, on the other. In the policy document it is stated that 'protection of human life, health and privacy are valued the most.' Another example of conflicting goals is the following which is found in passage 2.1: 'In addition to legal requirements, there are additional demands from organisations and the public, stating that information must be correct, it must be available and must be handled with respect to privacy or publicity.' In this case the tension is between privacy and publicity. A third example is passage 2.11 gives advises 'for management of information'. However, these advises are not directed towards employees only. From an employee's point of view it is contradictory that information should not be stored on the local disc, but at the same time backup should always be taken. In all these cases the information security management leaves the employees without any guidance on how to choose between the conflicting goals.

## 4.2    Towards tentative quality criteria

The practice-based discourse analysis of this case material has revealed problems with the information security policy. The analysis has aimed for abstraction and four themes have been formulated. These abstracted themes (designating problematic areas in the information security policy) were used for articulating general expectations on policy features. The underlying assumption in our work is that an information security policy should be functional in regulating employees' actions with respect to information security. The policy documents must be comprehensive and useful in guiding employees' actions. The discourse analysis (including the open coding, the theory-informed characterisation and the generation and grounding of themes) has been a generative basis for formulation of tentative quality criteria for information security policies in health care. The eight criteria are presented in Table 3. The table has three columns. The left-most column contains the identifier of the criteria, the middle col umn contains the quality criteria, a short explanation and motivation, and the right-most column contains the associated theme. The quality criteria express what is considered a good information security policy in health care, i.e. they express positive design values. We have formulated them as criteria that can be useful both in a design/formulation situation and in an evaluation situation. Our criteria cover both the whole information security policy (possibly consisting of different documents of both high-level and low-level character) and different parts of such policy documents.

**Table 3.** Eight tentative quality criteria for design of information security policies in health care

| No | Quality Criteria | Theme |
|----|------------------|-------|
| 1 | *The information security policy shall not introduce goal conflicts.* We identified several goal conflicts (1.2, 2.1) that the employees were left to manage. Hence, the policy was ambiguous with regard to how the employees were to prioritize. | Goal conflicts |
| 2 | *External policies shall be translated and transformed to the current work practice when such parts are included in the information security policy.* Our analysis (1.3) showed that parts of laws and international standards were included in the policy without paying attention to the local context, or that only vague references were provide to laws. | External congruence |
| 3 | *The information security policy (or explicit parts thereof) shall have clear and uniformed user groups.* The analysis (2.7) showed that it was unclear who were affected by the instructions. Thus, the policy had an ambiguous target group. | Target group |
| 4 | *The information security policy shall contain congruent guidelines for actions that are well adapted to the current work practice.* The analysis (2.6, 3.5, 3.7) showed that instructions are provided at a general level, which left room for interpretation on how to implement the guidelines in the work practice. | Internal congruence |
| 5 | *The information security policy shall have a clear and congruent conceptual framework adapted to the current work practice.* The analysis (1.4, 2.4, 2.6, 2.11) showed an ambiguous use of concepts, where several different concepts were used for the same phenomenon. As a consequence, the policy was ambiguous when referring to phenomena in the work practice. | Internal congruence |
| 6 | *The information security policy (in whole and parts) shall have a clear structure.* Our analysis (2.7, 2.17) showed ambiguously structured documents were phenomena concerning the same target group were discussed at multiple places. Thus it was difficult for employees to know when they had assimilated all information concerning a specific phenomenon. | Internal congruence |
| 7 | *The information security policy (in whole and parts) shall have clear objectives; implying clear communicative functions of the document.* Our analysis (2.6) showed that the communicative functions of specific parts of the documents were unclear (regulative and educational sections are highly intertwined). As a consequence, it was difficult to identify regulatory instructions. | Internal congruence |
| 8 | *The information security policy shall be constitutively clear; clarifying responsibilities and social commitments and expectations.* The analysis (2.10) showed that the responsibilities of the employees were unclear. Hence, it was difficult to achieve accountability. | Target group |

## 5    Conclusions

An information security policy of high communicative quality has the potential to be a practical and useful tool for secure electronic government. This is much needed in order to manage information security effectively in public administration, and to increase employees' compliance with information security policies. The purpose of this paper was a) to illustrate the usefulness of practice-based discourse analysis for understanding information security policy design, and b) to provide a set of tentative quality criteria for information security policies in health care from a practice perspective. Based on a practice-base discourse analysis that includes high-level and low-level information security policy documents we suggest eight quality criteria for design of information security policies in health care. Our findings are based on one case study and hence are provisional knowledge. We therefore see interesting venues for future research to further validate the criteria and make them more precise. Another research task, which is beyond the scope of this paper, is to investigate if any of these criteria are applicable in other business sectors, and if so to what extent.

Our quality criteria have, to some extent, similarities with the criteria presented by Stahl et al. [15]. If we are to highlight one similarity, both studies stress the importance of using a clear and congruent conceptual framework adapted to the current work practice. Otherwise, the policies are not accessible to the employees. However, unlike Stahl et al. [15] our quality criteria also address the importance the structure of policy documents. This difference is natural since Stahl et al. [15] limited their study to high-level policies, whereas we studied both high-level *and* low-level policy documents and their relationships.

The criteria presented are all derived from a practice-based perspective. It means that they emphasize information security policies as *useful tools for employees*. This perspective represents an alternative and a contrast to the management perspective, which is common in existing information security research. As a result some of our criteria might be seen as controversial from a management perspective. Of course, when designing information security policies both perspectives need to be acknowledged in order to create a balanced solution. Our list of quality criteria is one important component in the discussion to find such a balance.

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